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“Fly Home Ye Ravens!”: How the FCC’s Abandonment of 
Broadband Regulation Will Harm Music Diversity 
By Luke Batty1 
Citing supposed harms to competition among Internet service 
providers, the 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom Order reverses a 
decade long push to implement a regime of broadband regulation 
protecting net neutrality. However, the 2017 Order failed to recognize 
non-pecuniary interests in its sweeping change. Critical infrastructure, 
national security, and democracy all rely on a free and open Internet. 
Music creates an outlet for diverse cultural and individual 
representation, allowing artists and audiences to participate in 
democratic dialogues by creating and listening to music. The music 
industry shifted to online streaming as the primary market for artists 
to reach audiences. The possibility of instant global access for creators 
and audiences alike relies on an Internet free from blocking, throttling, 
and prioritization arrangements by Internet service providers. If 
Internet services providers exercise their gatekeeping capabilities, as 
courts have anticipated and the 2017 Order permits, artists will be 
forced to rely more substantially on outdated markets where their 
individual creativity may be stifled. The argument that audience 
demand will preserve worthy artists fails because it ignores creators' 
contributions as inherently relevant to democracy. In addition, the 
audience will be less accessible as Internet service providers will exert 
greater control over the availability of streaming services and social 
media platforms provided to their users through prioritization and 
zero-rating arrangements. Music embodies the broad, democratic 
character of the Internet that the 2017 Order ignores and trivializes; 
arguably, fatally so. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 Before riding her horse into a bonfire, Brünnhilde releases 
Wotan’s ravens to spread the flames, thus completing Richard 
Wagner’s “Ring Cycle” in Götterdämmerung.2 Brünnhilde’s aria ends 
with her self-immolation, as the funeral pyre engulfs all of Valhalla and 
its gods, bringing the end of the world.3 
 Enter our twenty-first century Brünnhilde, FCC Chairman Ajit 
Pai. The FCC’s repeal of net neutrality protections4 is nothing less than 
an apocalyptic divestment of the agency’s duties and regulatory 
authority. The FCC’s Restoring Internet Freedom Order (the “2017 
Order”) changes and attacks the character of the Internet as the 
foundation for modern speech and democratic debate. In the spirit of 
Wagner, the casualties of the FCC’s proposal include niche music 
genres that challenge perceptions of artistry and cultural norms.5 Rather 
than leading to a rebirth and renewal, the FCC’s repeal of Tittle II 
protections turns control of the Internet over to Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) who the FCC’s rules will allow to block, throttle, or 
require payment for Internet priority or protection against Internet 
degradation due to ISP management.6  
                                                          
2 RICHARD WAGNER, GÖTTERDÄMMERUNG, 61-62 (Oliver Ditson Co. 1926) (1876).  
3 Id. at 62. See also WILLIAM O. CORD, AN INTRODUCTION TO RICHARD WAGNER’S DER RING 
DES NIBELUNGEN, 10 (1983) (“The poem relates the actions that lead to and conclude with the 
destruction of the ancient gods, the doom of the corrupt world they had shaped, and the rebirth of 
the universe.”). 
4 Restoring Internet Freedom, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 82 Fed. Reg. 25568, (rel. May 23, 
2017) (hereinafter Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM); Proposal to Restore Internet Freedom, 
Public Draft (proposed Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.fcc.gov/document/proposal-restore-internet-
freedom (hereinafter Restoring Internet Freedom Draft Order); Restoring Internet Freedom, 83 
Fed. Reg. 7852 (Feb. 22, 2018) (hereinafter Restoring Internet Freedom Order). 
5 See Cord, supra note 3, at 6 (“[Wagner’s] ideas did not represent mere modifications or 
alterations. Rather, they advocated a completely new and radically different operatic tradition…. 
The practiced and the professional, the famous and the near-famous, the scholar and the artist 
lifted their pens in denunciation of his ideas.”). 
6 Restoring Internet Freedom Draft Order, supra note 4, ¶ 235. 
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While the Internet created some hurdles for musicians and 
copyright holders,7 the overall advantages of global networking offered 
profound and positive impacts on artists. Selling merchandise, 
announcing events, and increased outlet diversity helped artists thrive.8 
Artists no longer had to rely on major labels or broadcasters to pick up 
their songs in order to distribute them. In addition to streaming and 
MP3 file sharing, subcultures and forums arose to advance niche music 
genres. For example, the online forum Reddit has a growing catalogue 
of “recommended niche” genres available for perusal: the classical 
genre network has thirteen subgenres listed; electronic music has an 
more than eighty linked subgenre forums; the combined rock/metal 
category has nearly as many subgenre communities.9 This rich cultural 
network of music styles could not exist without regulations protecting 
a truly free and open Internet. 
The repeal of net neutrality deserves review as it impacts music 
diversity, a valuable democratic and cultural asset. First, the legal 
history of net neutrality leading up to the repeal of the 2015 Open 
Internet Order (the “2015 Order”) will contextualize the new regulatory 
regime. Second, music diversity will be defined and recognized as a 
valued part of democracy, framing the effects of the 2015 Order. Third, 
the paper will demonstrate how the prospective consequences of the 
FCC’s repeal will harm music diversity by giving broadband providers 
more power over content creators, regressively forcing artists into 
markets subject to the FCC’s “public interest” standard. Finally, the 
public interest standard will be analyzed as adverse to music diversity.  
I. LEGAL HISTORY OF NET NEUTRALITY 
The FCC’s 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (the “NPRM”) indicated the FCC’s intent to adopt 
regressive policies that would prevent equal Internet access and 
distribution of information.10 The proposal sought to repeal the 
agency’s 2015 Open Internet Order.11 Namely, the FCC announced 
                                                          
7 See, e.g., A&M Records v. Napster Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002); MGM Studios Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
8 See Casey Rae-Hunter, Licensing, Access, and Innovation in the New Music Marketplace, 7 J. 
BUS. & TECH. L. 35, 39 (2012). See also Alliance for Media Arts & Culture et al., Comment Letter 
on Restoring Internet Freedom, WC Docket No. 17-108 (Aug. 30, 2017) (“Under the existing 
open Internet rules, anyone with a robust broadband or mobile connection can reach users, 
promote their work and sell creative products and services without having to ask permission or 
pay a toll to an ISP.”). 
9 Subreddits by Genre, REDDIT (last visited Oct. 27, 2018), 
https://www.reddit.com/r/Music/wiki/musicsubreddits. 
10 See generally Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM, supra note 4. 
11 Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM, supra note 4, ¶ 24. See also, In the Matter of Protecting 
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their plan to revert broadband providers’ classification as 
telecommunication services back to information services, thus 
removing the limited common carriage restrictions the 2015 Order 
imposed.12 The FCC spent several years trying to impose regulations 
on broadband providers because the agency believed broadband 
providers were exercising unfair competitive advantages by funneling 
user traffic to its own content and applications.13 The FCC also sought 
to protect the Internet’s open character which it characterized as an 
engine of innovation.14 Ironically, the general implications and risks of 
repealing net neutrality are best presented by studying the FCC’s prior 
attempts at regulation. Therefore, the legal history and evaluation of 
the current state of issues are best presented hand-in-hand.  
The Communications Act of 1934 created the FCC to regulate the 
use of the electromagnetic spectrum.15 In addition to this general grant 
of authority, certain spectrum-based industries and practices were also 
recognized for more specific regulation under the 1934 Act. 
Specifically, the FCC was tasked with licensing spectrum for 
broadcasting16 and enforcing common carriage requirements under 
Title II.17 Under Title II, common carriers are for-hire services that 
provide an indiscriminate outlet for users to both receive and send 
information.18  
The development of broadband required the FCC to determine 
how to regulate the internet and broadband providers as Internet service 
progressed from private-to-public telephone lines to a network of 
cable, fiber, and wireless connections as last-mile delivery 
mechanisms.19 The majority of net neutrality regulations have focused 
                                                          
and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015) (hereinafter 2015 Open Internet 
Order). 
12 Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM, supra note 4, ¶ 25.  
13 See Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., 600 F.3d 642, 644 (2010). Comcast allegedly throttled peer-to-
peer services. See also, Verizon v. Fed Comm. Comm’n, 740 F.3d 615, 623 (2014). Verizon 
allegedly throttled Apple’s FaceTime app to incentivize the use of its own Voice over Internet 
Protocol (VoIP) application. 
14 Open Internet Order, supra note 11, ¶ 2; Verizon, 740 F.3d at 634. 
15 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, Title I, sec. 1, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (codified 
at 47 U.S.C. § 151). 
16 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, Title III, sec. 301, 48 Stat. 1064, 1081 
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 301). 
17 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, Title II, sec. 201, 48 Stat. 1064, 1070 
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 201). 
18 47 U.S.C. § 153(11) (2012). See also, United States Telecom Ass’n v. F.C.C., 825 F.3d 674, 
707 (D.C. Cir 2016) (“[C]ommon carrier obligations [require] broadband providers to offer 
indiscriminate service to edge providers.”). 
19 See Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Disclosure, Deception, and Deep-Packet Inspection: The Role of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act's Deceptive Conduct Prohibitions in the Net Neutrality 
Debate, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 652-59 (2009). 
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on whether broadband providers should be regulated under the FCC’s 
general authorization to manage wired and wireless communications 
per Title I of the Communications Act of 1934 or alternatively whether 
broadband providers are subject to some form of common carriage 
standards under Title II. During the 1960s-1980s, the FCC developed 
several frameworks for considering prospective regulations on the 
Internet and computer networks.20 First, the FCC recognized the four 
parties involved in Internet use: (1) broadband lines (the infrastructure 
of the network), (2) broadband providers (the subscription services 
permitting access to the Internet as Internet service providers), (3) edge 
providers (online content creators and services), and (4) end users 
(edge providers’ audience and broadband providers’ customers).21 
Computers were categorized into “basic” and “enhanced services” 
regarding their participation in telecommunication services.22 Under 
Computer Inquiry II (Computer II) adopted in 1980, the FCC defined 
“basic services” as the systems of communications where the digital 
and analog voice, video, and data were transmitted without being 
altered in form or stored.23 Under Computer II, any service that stored 
or modified the information, namely through user input, qualified as an 
“enhanced service.”24 While basic services had an enforceable duty to 
serve the public as common carriers, enhanced services operated on a 
client-by-client basis, creating content and services as well providing 
the materials to an audience.25 
Congress codified this framework in the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996 (the “1996 Act”). Under the 1996 Act, basic services were 
recognized as “telecommunications services,” subject to common 
carriage restrictions.26 Enhanced services, including broadband 
providers, were reclassified as “information services.”27 During this 
                                                          
20 See Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and 
Communication Services and Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (Mar. 18, 1971) (“Computer Inquiry I”); 
Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Second Computer 
Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, ¶¶ 6-7 (May 2, 1980) (“Computer Inquiry II”); Amendment of Sections 
64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), 104 F.C.C.2d 958 
(June 16, 1986). 
21  See Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, ¶ 20 (2010). 
22 Computer Inquiry II, supra note 20, ¶ 97. 
23 Computer Inquiry II, supra note 20, ¶ 95. See also, Robert Cannon, The Legacy of Federal 
Communications Commissions’ Computer Inquiries, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 167, 183-84 (2003). 
24 Computer Inquiry II, supra note 20, ¶ 5. 
25  See Cannon, supra note 23, at 183-84.  
26 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 3(a)(48-51), 110 Stat. 56, 60 
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 153). 
27 Sec. 3(a)(41), 110 Stat. at 59. But see Cannon, supra 23, at 191-92. Cannon points out some 
differences between the enhanced services and information services designations based on the 
different uses of telecommunications versus telecommunications services. 
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time, Internet service providers were only subject to common carriage 
requirements in their role as a dial-up service accessing telephone 
lines.28  
 Following the 1996 Act, the Supreme Court analyzed the 
statutes to interpret whether cable broadband providers fell into the 
information or telecommunications services. The split between 
Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia in National Cable & 
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services prompted the 
FCC’s campaign to enact net neutrality protections over the following 
decade.29 Thomas, writing for the majority, held that the agency 
reasonably interpreted that broadband providers did not offer 
telecommunications because even though broadband services used 
telecommunications to deliver Internet connection, providers did not 
independently offer telecommunications, independent of the 
communications service, and therefore could not be treated as 
telecommunications services.30 Scalia’s dissent attacked this 
interpretation, claiming that broadband service could not be separated 
from telecommunications service based on the shared infrastructure.31 
The dissent provided a prophetic view of society’s growing reliance on 
Internet, and provided the allegory of the pizza parlor: if a pizza parlor 
refuses to “offer” delivery but will bring the pizza to the customer’s 
house as part of a “pizzeria-pizza-at-home service,” the parlor does in 
fact offer delivery.32 A separate delivery service, according to 
Thomas’s view, would independently offer delivery of other 
restaurant’s pizza. To Scalia, the inseparable nature of broadband 
access and its method of delivery provide not only a more reasonable 
and pragmatic view, but arguably the only reasonable interpretation 
when compared to Thomas’s semantics. 
Following Brand X, the FCC proscribed its Internet policy 
objectives and created a set of voluntary principles for broadband 
providers to further these objectives.33 Soon after, Comcast tested the 
FCC’s ability to enforce these “voluntary” principles by throttling peer-
to-peer communications in 2007.34 The FCC claimed they were 
authorized to regulate broadband providers under an ancillary 
                                                          
28 See Sandoval, supra note 19, at 653. 
29 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
30 Id. at 988-89. 
31 Id. at 1006 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
32 Id. at 1007 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
33 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC 
Rcd. 14986, at ¶ 4 (Sept. 23, 2005). 
34 Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for 
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 28 FCC Rcd. 13028 (Aug. 20, 2008).  
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jurisdiction theory.35 Specifically, the agency pointed to a policy 
statement in the 1996 Act promoting the FCC’s purpose under Title I 
to increase the public’s Internet and telecommunications access via 
broadband providers.36 The Commission also defended the legitimacy 
of the voluntary principles based on Justice Thomas’s approval of 
exercising such enforcement under ancillary jurisdiction in Brand X.37 
The FCC argued that Comcast’s degradation of data transmissions 
directly conflicted with the agency’s goals to increase “rapid” and 
“efficient” Internet access across the country.38 Essentially, a 
broadband provider was operating spectrum in the form of wired 
communications contrary to the public interest, requiring an FCC 
intervention.  
The court held that the FCC lacked congressional authorization to 
implement anti-discriminatory regulations.39 Specifically, the FCC had 
misplaced its reliance on Section 706 of the 1996 Act because a prior 
FCC order only considered the section a policy statement proposing the 
FCC regulations advance public broadband access at reasonable rates 
rather than a statutory authorization.40 Therefore, the FCC lacked 
regulatory authority absent a change in their own record reconsidering 
whether Section 706 constituted an independent grant of authority.  The 
FCC could not ground its rulemaking authority in independent policy 
statements.41 Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C. proved that the FCC’s voluntary 
principles were toothless. 
Following Comcast, the FCC changed its interpretation of Section 
706. The 2010 Open Internet Order specifically reclassified Section 
706 as an independent statutory grant of authority.42 With this newly 
minted authority, the FCC imposed transparency requirements, anti-
discrimination and anti-blocking limits on broadband providers.43 
These rules intended to protect the “virtuous circle” of innovation as 
independent edge providers created content and services for end 
users.44 Absent such protections, the FCC believed broadband 
                                                          
35 Id. ¶ 18. 
36 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 706, 110 Stat. 56, 153 (codified at 
47 U.S.C. § 1302(a)). See also Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., 600 F.3d 642, 658 (D.C. Cir 2010). 
37 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 996 (2005) (“[T]he Commission remains free to impose special regulatory 
duties on facilities-based ISPs under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction.”) 
38 Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for 
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 28 FCC Rcd. at 13036-37, ¶ 16.  
39 Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 661. 
40 Id. at 658. 
41 Id. at 644. 
42 Preserving the Open Internet Report and Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, ¶ 117 (Dec. 23, 2010).  
43 Id. ¶ 43. 
44 Id. ¶¶ 13-17. 
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providers would exercise gatekeeping control over independent edge 
providers, creating a competitive advantage for broadband providers’ 
own resources.45 For example, Comcast could throttle user traffic to 
Google and Yahoo, incentivizing users to Comcast’s own website as a 
source of news, web searching, and advertising. 
However, these measures also failed in court due to the FCC’s 
failure to classify ISPs as common carriers while imposing common 
carriage style rules. In Verizon v. F.C.C., the court held that while the 
FCC’s new interpretation of Section 706 was reasonable, confirming 
that the statute promulgated regulation the FCC could cite to enact 
restrictions such as transparency rules that require ISPs to disclose their 
network management practice.46 The D.C. Circuit held that the 
blocking and non-discrimination rules the FCC adopted as part of the 
2010 Order imposed per se common carriage obligations on ISP 
without appropriately classifying broadband providers as common 
carriers subject to regulation under Title II.47 The court noted that 
broadband providers could, and likely would, exercise gatekeeping 
control.48  
The D.C. Circuit held that 1996 Act specifically exempted 
information services from common carriage responsibilities, namely 
the duty to serve the public indiscriminately.49 This distinction, 
according to the court, permitted broadband providers to discriminate 
against edge providers and end users by blocking, restricting, and 
preferring competing edge providers unless the FCC classified ISPs as 
common carriers.50 
After licking their wounds for a second time, the FCC returned 
with the 2015 Open Internet Order (the “2015 Order”) which aimed to 
satisfy the issues preventing common carriage regulations presented in 
Verizon.51 First, the FCC restated their updated interpretation of 
Section 706 as a statutory grant of authority allowing the FCC to take 
action to promote broadband deployment, including action to prevent 
Internet discrimination.52 Verizon specifically approved this 
                                                          
45 Verizon v. F.C.C., 740 F.3d 623, 646 (2014).  
46 Id. at 659. 
47 Id. at 655-56. 
48 Id. at 646 (“[B]roadband providers have the technical and economic ability to impose such 
restrictions. Verizon does not seriously contend otherwise. In fact, there appears little dispute that 
broadband providers have the technological ability to distinguish between and discriminate 
against certain types of Internet traffic.”). 
49 Id. at 646. 
50 Id. at 658. 
51 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 11.  
52 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 11, ¶ 275. 
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interpretation, thus overcoming the FCC’s error in Comcast Corp.53 
Second, the FCC classified ISPs as common carriers, imposing limited 
common carrier obligations on ISPs to promote the “virtuous circle” 
theory of Internet innovation.54 The 1996 Act borrowed its framework 
of telecommunication services from Computer Inquiry II, which 
contained three categories: basic services, enhanced services, and 
enhanced services that facilitate basic services.55 When the 1996 Act 
codified this theory, it silently recognized the third facilitating 
category. According to the FCC, information services that facilitate the 
distribution of telecommunication services were additionally subject to 
common carriage rules.56  
The FCC claimed that in their role as telecommunication 
facilitators, broadband providers could exercise gatekeeping harmful 
to the public, a theory the court in Verizon considered legitimate.57 To 
counter the threat of ISP gatekeeping, the 2015 Order provided three 
“bright line rules” for broadband providers to follow as common 
carriers; no blocking, throttling, or paid prioritization.58 These rules 
only amounted to limited common carriage obligations because the 
2015 Order allowed application-specific exceptions for reasonable 
network management; ISPs could block or throttle as long as it would 
be done indiscriminately and “tailored to achieving a limited network 
management purpose.”59 However, the 2015 Order created no such 
exception for paid prioritization because “paid prioritization is 
inherently a business practice rather than a network management 
practice.”60  
The 2015 Order succeeded where prior attempts to regulate failed. 
During litigation, the court upheld the facilitation theory because, 
according to the court, broadband providers facilitated the 
communication and connection between end users and edge providers 
and consequently took on common carriage responsibilities.61 The 
2015 Order successfully enacted net neutrality protections. 
                                                          
53 Verizon, 740 F. 3d at 741 (“We think it quite reasonable to believe that Congress contemplated 
that the Commission would regulate this industry, as the agency had in the past, and the scope of 
any authority granted to it by section 706(b).”). 
54 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 11, ¶ 283. 
55 Computer Inquiry II, supra note 20, ¶ 2-4. 
56 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 11, ¶ 331. 
57 Verizon, 740 F.3d at 646. 
58 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 11, ¶¶ 14-19. 
59 Id. ¶ 32.  
60 Id. ¶ 18 n.18.  
61 United States Telecom Ass’n v. F.C.C., 825 F.3d 674, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2016), aff’d, 855 F. 3d 
381 (D.C. Cir 2017). 
88 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.  [Vol. 35 
However, the net neutrality regime was short lived. An executive 
shakeup placed Ajit Pai as head commissioner of the FCC following 
the 2016 Presidential Election. Pai vigorously opposed the 2015 Order 
and quickly issued the 2017 NPRM.62 The proposal rejected the 2015 
order as a success for the public, seeking a full repeal of the policy.63 
The NPRM sought to tear down the common carriage regulations on 
broadband providers and utilize ex post enforcement of anticompetitive 
violations.64 This would permit broadband providers to discriminate 
against edge providers by throttling and blocking content or demanding 
fees for preference and access to end users. Considering the outcomes 
in Comcast and Verizon, indicating that ancillary jurisdiction is no 
more than a fiction and voluntary principles have no legal 
ramifications, the FCC would wash their hands clean from broadband 
regulation.  
In December of 2017, three of the five FCC commissioners passed 
the Restoring Internet Freedom Order (the “2017 Order”), repealing 
Title II protections.65 The repeal specifically abandons the 
classification of ISPs as information services facilitating 
telecommunications services, consequently invalidating the 
foundations of the limited common carrier obligations, and instead 
reinstating ISP’s status as information service providers.66 As a result, 
the FCC cannot enforce the limited common carrier provisions set forth 
by the 2015 Order’s bright line rules that prevented blocking, 
throttling, and paid prioritization because the 2017 Order removes the 
regulatory rug out from under enforceable rules to oversee such 
behavior. Further confirming the agency’s intent to abdicate its 
responsibility to preserve the Internet as a democratic forum, the 2017 
Order names the Federal Trade Commission as the enforcing body.67 
As the FTC is limited to preventing anticompetitive practices between 
ISPs, and has some jurisdiction to address misrepresentations such as 
a mismatch between ISP promises and practices,68 there is apparently 
no executive body expressly seeking to preserve the Internet’s 
democratic and participatory character. The FCC’s repeal solely 
focuses on harms to competition, leaving non-pecuniary harms and 
                                                          
62 Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM, supra note 4. 
63 Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM, supra note 4, ¶ 70. 
64 Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM, supra note 4, ¶¶ 76-91. 
65 See Cecilia Kang, F.C.C. Repeals Net Neutrality Rules, N.Y.T. (Dec. 14, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/14/technology/net-neutrality-repeal-vote.html. 
66 Restoring Internet Freedom Order, supra note 4, ¶ 20. 
67 Restoring Internet Freedom Order, supra note 4, ¶ 2. 
68 See Sandoval, supra note 19, at 694-95 (arguing that the FTC review ISP disclosures for 
deceptive conduct).  
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interests without a remedy as the Supreme Court has held that antitrust 
laws only provide redress for competition harms.69 While the FTC can 
foreseeably address mismatches between ISP promises and 
performance – such as whether offering “unlimited” plans amounts to 
deceptive conduct70 – FTC jurisdiction will not capture the breadth of 
harms that can result from ISP blocking, throttling, and paid priority. 
The post hoc enforcement method also leaves greater uncertainty as to 
the legitimacy of individual practices compared to bright line rules, 
assuming the FTC would even pursue such enforcement.   
Part of the Internet’s democratic function stems from its 
magnificent breadth of content. Music may only be a small part of what 
the Internet offers but as an industry, music has adapted and benefitted 
from an informational world like few others. Therefore, the relation 
between music and the Internet can serve as a case-study to understand 
the value of net neutrality. The prospective impacts of repealing net 
neutrality policies present substantial dangers to the music as an 
industry and an art, and therefore threaten democracy. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE 2015 OPEN INTERNET POLICIES 
While many online music innovations predate the 2015 Open 
Internet Order, anti-discriminatory policies benefit and protect the 
music industry’s online presence. This section will detail three primary 
ways artists and copyright holders benefit from a regulatory framework 
that preserves net neutrality. 
A. Expansion of Music Delivery 
For many of these genres, alternative markets and methods of 
distribution are limited beyond the internet. Music forums, like certain 
divisions on Reddit, allow artists and audiences to share, recommend, 
and discuss the subculture where other outlets may not be widely 
accessible. For example, “doom metal” is a metal subgenre that draws 
influences from progressive and experimental rock from the 1970s and 
1980s as well as the original metal band, Black Sabbath.71 The lyrical 
content is gloomy and apocalyptic while the music itself is slow and 
                                                          
69 See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990) (“[I]njury, although 
causally related to an antitrust violation, nevertheless will not qualify as ‘antitrust injury’ unless 
it is attributable to an anti-competitive aspect of the practice under scrutiny.”). See also Catherine 
J.K. Sandoval, Net Neutrality Powers Energy and Forestalls Climate Change, 9 SAN DIEGO J. 
CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 1, 63 (2018) (arguing that the 2017 Order did not address harms to 
national security, particularly critical infrastructure). 
70 See Sandoval, supra note 19, at 694-95. 
71 See Bethany Tiamat, Guide to Metal Subgenres, BEAT (July 2017), https://beat.media/guide-to-
metal-subgenres. 
90 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.  [Vol. 35 
monotonous with tracks frequently exceeding the twenty-minute mark. 
A radio station would likely be unable to consistently draw a 
substantial local audience and keep their attention to sustain a doom 
metal focused broadcast outlet. 
Other genres may not enjoy alternatives markets without 
sacrificing artistic integrity. Broadcast is subject to indecency 
censorship imposed by government regulation to serve the public 
interest, as well as voluntary censoring by the network.72 Artists can 
promote their work uninhibited via the Internet, but radio broadcast 
requires edited versions. For example, drill music is a hip-hop subgenre 
with a unique Chicagoan gangster rap perspective.73 The content of the 
songs may not be radio appropriate, but to restrict the content would 
minimize the artist’s viewpoint and voice. The Internet provided a 
forum for the Chicago style to reach global audiences. In some cases, 
the international response to drill music sought to restrict the art form; 
several have attributed violence in the UK to drill music and sought to 
quash the genre.74 Without the Internet, subgenres like drill would need 
to rely only on live performances and physical records for distribution 
because even if the genre had a substantial local following, the 
restrictions on the content of the music would inherently detract from 
the viewpoint to which the audience relates. Absent a free and open 
Internet, genres like drill could also be susceptible to censorship if the 
broadband provider so decided based on a fear of liability for violent 
acts, no matter how tenuous the relation. Additionally, nothing in the 
2017 Order prevents ISPs from accepting money from interest groups, 
for instance groups who may find drill music to be a source of violence. 
ISPs could then block and throttle certain content without specifically 
disclosing that the ISP had done so, as the 2017 Order only requires an 
admission that the ISP engages in prioritization arrangements without 
disclosing any of the terms, such as the parties or effected content.75  
                                                          
72 Pacifica Found. v. F.C.C., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).  
73 See David Drake, Chicago Rap Blazes Up from the Streets, SPIN (June 25, 2012), 
https://www.spin.com/2012/06/chicago-rap-blazes-streets/. 
74 See, e.g., Ben Beaumont-Thomas, Is UK Drill Music Really behind London’s Wave of Violent 
Crime?, GUARDIAN (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/music/2018/apr/09/uk-drill-
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75 See Restoring Internet Freedom Order, supra note 4, ¶ 220. See also Sandoval, supra note 69, 
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Some of niche musical genres may have been popular or had a 
substantial following for a time, but broadcasting outlets have focused 
on newer, more popular works. For example, the Reddit forum 
“Outrun” is dedicated to a 1980s retrofuturism aesthetic.76 As an 
electronic music subgenre, the synthesizers and drum kits evoke a 
soundtrack for Detective Crockett’s Ferrari Testarossa in Miami Vice. 
While there may have been a broad audience in the 1980s, the genre 
modernly relies on the Internet for artists to spread awareness of their 
work. 
Modern subgenres may also rely on the Internet to gain attention 
in alternative markets saturated by nostalgia and audiences who only 
want to hear the hits. Classical music has struggled to attract new 
audiences with fresh content. But at the same time, classical 
performances and curators are frequently constrained to satisfying 
conservative audience tastes.77 Concert programmers choose music 
that appeals to the traditional taste (Beethoven, Mozart, Dvorak, etc.) 
and may throw in something novel, such as a premiere. However, the 
novelty expires following the premiere and the work is often 
forgotten.78 Online forums allow composers to find performers and 
build a relationship that sustains both parties. Audience-based forums 
focus on new or lesser known works that deserve recognition. Twenty-
first century technology allows musicians to find and distribute other 
collaborators and works to expand the repertoire. 
B. In Defense of Music Diversity 
Repealing net neutrality threatens the growing number of niche 
genres that have gained a following because they can access audiences 
without geographic limitations. Striking down Title II protections 
would decimate the artists who have been able to create and distribute 
music via the Internet. Ultimately, this new era of music diversity must 
be deemed worth protecting. Music diversity is more than a desirable 
end. Cultural representation, artistic expression, and democratic 
dialogue all factor into music diversity and a repeal would threaten 
these values as well. 
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The arts are fundamental to culture. The modern philosophy of 
aesthetics studies the person’s sensory approach and understanding of 
the world around them.79 The role of fine arts, in the broadest possible 
definition of the term, within culture allows for the creation and 
elevation of expression for profound purposes.80 Classical philosophy 
recognized the arts as part of the development of the whole person, 
shaping the person’s skills and virtues.81 The United States’ founders 
also recognized the value of the arts in society by creating patent and 
copyright protections as well as granting broad protection to artistic 
expression.82 American culture in the twentieth-century accelerated an 
interest in individual development as technology created an optimistic 
feeling that human creativity could solve the ills of the world.83 The 
arts, including music, are intimately related to person’s ability to 
understand themselves. They also present an elevated form of speech 
for broadcasting a viewpoint. 
Composers, performers, and music enthusiasts on the Internet use 
modern technology to promote their own individual development and 
increase viewpoint diversity. Online personalities have access to more 
venues for discussion and as a result must learn to communicate and 
understand others as well as themselves.84 Venues where multiple 
personalities can engage each other promote viewpoint diversity and 
intercultural communication. Music forums, where people share 
musical new works, techniques, and genres provide fertile grounds for 
viewpoint diversity.  
Art’s connection with an individual is only part of the equation; 
art also embodies cultures. Music promotes individual and cultural 
viewpoints. For example, drill music could be considered a specific 
                                                          
79 See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 59 (Tr. Marcus Weigelt) (2008);   
80 See BRADLEY MURRAY, THE POSSIBILITY OF CULTURE: PLEASURE AND MORAL 
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83 Stephen M. Feldman, Postmodern Free Expression: A Philosophical Rationale for the Digital 
Age, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 1123, 1143 (2017). 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sub-genre of trap music, a broader sub-genre of hip hop.85 Drill’s 
specificity stems from its focus on Chicago culture. Cultural sub-
genres are a timeless aspect of music. Christian rock, Argentinian 
tango, and “riot grrrl” punk carry cultural elements in their 
compositions. Musical subgenres greatly benefitted from a free and 
open Internet because it promoted greater representation of individual 
and cultural viewpoints. 
The FCC has recognized the importance of viewpoint diversity, 
especially minority viewpoints, in other contexts. The FCC’s minority 
broadcast ownership rules intended to increase the number of 
minorities working in radio and broadcasting because it would spur 
more culturally reflective content.86 The FCC later abandoned the 
policy for failing to meet strict scrutiny,87 but it has never disavowed 
the value of viewpoint diversity and the Commission continues to 
promote diverse broadcast ownership. 
The Restoring Internet Freedom Order may be the closest the FCC 
has come to rejecting viewpoint diversity as an agency goal. Both the 
draft and final orders limit the public interest concerns that guide 
Internet regulation to anti-competitive enforcement and consumer 
deception protections, meaning the FCC denied redress for all non-
economic concerns that shape the democratic and participatory nature 
of the Internet.88 This specifically omits and contradicts agency 
concerns regarding ISPs restricting viewpoint diversity in the 2015 
Open Internet Order.89 Abandoning limited common carriage 
requirements for post hoc enforcement fails to serve individual speech 
interests and stifles intercultural communication.90 Therefore, 
repealing Title II protections, which restricts music diversity and 
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access to the arts online, directly harms viewpoint diversity and 
contradicts the agency’s mission. 
C. Internet Streaming  
The Internet dramatically increased access to music through on-
demand streaming. Previously, if a listener wanted to hear a specific 
work, they would need to own a physical copy to play. LP’s, vinyl 
recordings, audio cassettes, and CD’s became obsolete once on-
demand streaming became available for listeners. Additionally, this 
meant the copyright holders, whether it be the music labels or content 
creators themselves, also had to adjust their business models. Prior to 
online markets, labels and artists focused on broadcast licenses and unit 
sales.91 Audience access substituted streaming on-demand music for 
unit sales.92 Artists have taken various approaches to increase unit 
sales, for example delaying streaming access for a period following the 
release, forcing the consumer into a unit sale for on demand listening.93 
Another example of an increasingly popular approach, Radiohead’s 
2006 digital release of In Rainbows allowed users to choose their price 
to download the album.94 This audience controlled model succeeded by 
simplifying artist-to-audience content sharing. Radiohead incentivized 
purchasers to directly benefit the band rather than a streaming platform, 
advertiser, or record label.95 
Copyright holders could not adapt a unilateral approach to 
streaming services because each platform treated revenue streams and 
royalties differently. For example, Apple Music and Tidal classify 
themselves as “premium services” because they require a subscription 
for revenue.96 Spotify and Pandora introduced “Freemium” services 
that provide music streaming for free but rely on ad revenue.97 
Streaming services’ diversity also depends on the royalty method they 
utilize. Per-stream royalties compensate the rights holder per each play 
on the service. Spotify uses a “play-share” method, where the artist 
                                                          
91 Matthew Flynn, You Need Me Man, I Don't Need You: Exploring the Debates Surrounding the 
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receives a royalty commensurate to their “market share” of the total 
plays on the platform over a certain time.98 A faction of artists have 
supported a “user-share” model where the rights holder receives 
royalties based on the share of plays for each individual user who 
streamed their work because in subscription models, it allows the 
audience to more directly benefit the artists they actually listen to rather 
than paying a portion of their subscription to popular artists, to whom 
they may never listen.99 Under other models, more popular artists can 
window their releases by delaying streaming access or completely 
abstain from streaming services because they can rely on their 
following to participate in unit sales.100 Smaller artists typically do not 
have the luxury of abandoning streams because niche genres may rely 
on those platforms to reach an audience and receive some form of 
compensation. 
Amongst the different royalty models, a competing “no royalty” 
model in the form of digital piracy grew popular. Peer-to-peer services 
allowed users to share and access other’s music libraries without 
paying and became the primary method of digital piracy.101 Listeners 
have also avoided streaming services and unit sales through YouTube. 
While rights holders receive royalties for licensed videos on YouTube, 
ubiquitous unlicensed videos plague the video service. The 
combination of licensed and unlicensed content makes YouTube the 
largest music catalogue available online.102 For licensed music, 
streaming services pay on average eight-times in royalties more per 
play than YouTube.103 While YouTube must remove unlicensed videos 
upon request, unlicensed music videos remain available in droves until 
those requests are processed and are easily re-uploaded once the video 
is taken down.104 As long as YouTube responds to the requests, the site 
enjoys “safe harbor” protections under the Digital Millennium 
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Copyright Act, meaning it is not liable for royalties for unlicensed 
plays.105 
The Internet has become the premiere channel for music 
distribution but has also tormented rightsholders with broad 
infringement and meager royalties. A free and open Internet under the 
2015 Order at least protects rightsholders from extortion or competition 
based on paid prioritization. The repeal of the bright-line rule against 
paid prioritization may force musicians to counter ISPs as well as the 
streaming services to ensure their work reaches an audience in return 
for fair compensation.  
IV ANALYSIS OF MUSIC WITHOUT A FREE AND OPEN INTERNET: 
THREE SCENARIOS 
Before understanding the impacts on music diversity, it is worth 
noting what kind of Internet access issues would have legal standing 
following the repeal of net neutrality. The FCC’s draft order states that 
the Federal Trade Commission, rather than the FCC will be able to 
exercise dominion over ISPs.106 This narrows the public interest to 
consumer protection and anticompetitive actions. This notably omits 
prior considerations, namely viewpoint diversity as protected under the 
2015 Open Internet Order.107 Part of the Internet’s success, especially 
for music, undoubtedly relied on the democratic creation and sharing 
of content. Although it may not be protected, net-neutrality principles 
at least recognize the value of music diversity because it promotes a 
diverse array of artists and viewpoints.  
Without an interest in preserving viewpoint diversity, content 
creators and musicians will likely be subject to three possible scenarios 
to continue accessing an audience. First, content creators will need to 
contract with zero-rated services to achieve the broadest distribution of 
their work. Second, artists will need to pursue alternative markets 
despite the fact that many genres rely on the Internet because 
alternative markets are not easily available. Finally, ISPs will claim 
editorial rights and will need to clarify their obligations as curators. 
 
 
                                                          
105 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). 
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A. Zero-Rating and Paid Preference 
First, music distribution platforms are likely candidates to be zero-
rated by ISPs. Under this practice, an edge provider or third party pays 
the broadband provider to receive various benefits in reaching the end 
user. This form of paid-prioritization exemplifies broadband providers 
exercising discrimination. Zero-rating creates a competitive edge 
amongst edge providers because it incentivizes end users to favor 
certain content sources. By zero-rating their content, edge providers 
can pay to avoid throttling and blocking or subsidize end user’s data 
usage, meaning user’s access does not count towards their data cap.108 
If a music service is zero rated, artists are forced to rely on that sole 
distributor who then has substantial bargaining power when it comes 
to negotiating royalties because the audience is incentivized to use that 
service.  
Zero-rating in the forms of subsidized and sponsored data has 
already been adopted by wireless Internet providers trying to test the 
boundaries of the FCC’s 2015 Order, which permitted zero-rating on 
ad hoc basis until more conclusions on the value of the practice could 
be drawn.109 AT&T introduced a “Sponsored Data” plan open to any 
edge provider to subsidize user traffic in 2014.110 T-Mobile 
implemented similar sponsored data programs for music and video.111 
“Music Freedom,” the network’s music service, zero-rated Apple 
Music, Pandora, Spotify, and Google play among more than a dozen 
other music streaming services that continues to expand as T-Mobile 
customers can vote to add additional music streaming services.112  
T-Mobile’s music program stands out because the data is not 
subsidized by the benefitting edge providers, in this case the streaming 
                                                          
108 See Arturo J. Carillo, Having Your Cake and Eating It Too: Zero-Rating, Net Neutrality, and 
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services.113 This drew divisive support from some net-neutrality 
proponents because featured edge providers are not extorted, and the 
anticompetitive blight is diluted by creating a competitive market 
between the zero-rated services.114 Arguably, some of these services 
can even serve music diversity if they focus on niche genres. However, 
a more categorical view of Music Freedom recognizes the plan’s 
dangers.115 T-Mobile preferences certain data, regardless of who pays 
for it. Benign discrimination is no less discrimination. It still excludes 
edge providers who are not yet zero-rated under Music Freedom and 
therefore creates a competitive edge against those sites. Indeed, 
YouTube is the most popular music streaming service but is not 
covered under music freedom.116 While neither the streaming service 
nor user would pay for music streaming under Music Freedom, T-
Mobile never disclosed who was subsidizing the data. Early in Pai’s 
tenure as Chairman, the FCC dropped investigations into the matter.117 
This abdication of responsibility was a primary step in repealing net 
neutrality rules including the “general conduct standard” that allowed 
the FCC to challenge unreasonable conduct that threatened the public 
interest.118 Once a site does qualify for Music Freedom subsidization, 
it remains to be seen whether there is innovative competition between 
the providers. The niche genre services provided may not be 
competitive with Pandora, Spotify, or Apple Music who have marketed 
to broader tastes rather than music-focused communities.  
Ultimately, the debate regarding zero-rating completely ignores 
the role of the music creator, instead focusing on the audience and 
distributor. Music creators must still go through many of the same 
popular distributors who refuse to provide substantial pay in order to 
reach an audience. Further, zero-rating services like YouTube 
maintains demand in a market rife with unlicensed music that does not 
confer royalties to artists. 
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B. Alternative Markets 
If streaming services abuse their bargaining power to lower 
royalty rates, artists must seek alternative markets  to reach their 
audience. A similar shift to alternative markets occurred with the dawn 
of peer-to-peer file sharing programs such as Napster and Limewire 
because copyright holders no longer received royalties in online 
markets.119 Artists would rely on live performances, broadcasters, and 
unit sales, such as CDs or the revitalized industry of vinyl records, for 
income. Essentially, artists would have to regress in the methods of 
revenue they could rely on. Radio lost a substantial portion of its 
audience to digital music access at the outset of online music markets 
and that exodus only continued to grow following the 2015 Order.120 If 
artists cannot survive on online streaming royalties, they may 
discontinue licensing to the services and more actively grant licenses 
for broadcasters. As a result, the audience may follow the artists to the 
alternative medium. 
A select number of artists have successfully bucked the streaming 
services and relied on alternative markets. In 2014, Taylor Swift argued 
that “music should not be free” and removed her catalogue, consisting 
of four albums at the time, from Spotify.121 Less than a year later, Swift 
posted an open letter to Apple Music on a social media profile, again 
removing her catalogue from the streaming service for refusing to pay 
royalties during the service’s three-month free trial offer for users.122 
Swift’s music eventually returned to both platforms but not before 
creating a dialogue regarding whether streaming service royalties were 
fair when alternative methods of music distribution were available.  
Although, streaming services may not be ideal, alternative 
methods may not suffice for every artist. As a household name with a 
massive following, Swift could count on her fans to seek and purchase 
her album released several weeks after leaving streaming services. 
Artists without a comparable reputation may not be able to rely on 
alternative markets or have the bargaining power to make streaming 
services change their policies.123 Swift made a similar admission in her 
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op-ed declaring her break with Spotify, “Some artists will be like 
finding ‘the one.’ We will cherish every album they put out until they 
retire.”124 Ultimately, only the biggest names may be able to 
successfully shift to alternate markets, leaving niche genres and artists 
trapped among prioritized streaming services.  
In addition, artists rely on the Internet for more than distributing 
their works. Advertising events, coordinating venues, and selling 
merchandise all primarily happen over social media.125 This 
adaptability makes social media outlets ripe targets for paid 
prioritization. As a result, prioritized outlets would have substantial 
bargaining power because they would provide access to the desired 
audience and could pass the costs of prioritization onto the artists. The 
rate to “boost” one’s band on social media could potentially be 
exacerbated if the market concentrates into a few services.126 While 
focusing on ISPs and end users in the Restoring Internet Freedom 
Order, the FCC falls short because it fails to recognize content creators’ 
dependence on the Internet. Sadly, the dialogue between demanding 
consumers and service providers regarding music revenue and online 
distribution methods has largely excluded musicians in their role as 
content creators.127 Therefore, artists would need alternatives for 
streaming, publicizing, and merchandising at which point the audience 
may not follow unless the artist famous enough to work independent of 
online services. 
Another suggested alternative market would require wholly new 
infrastructure. Entertainment is expected to become the dominant 
majority of Internet traffic and may require an alternate Internet 
“backbone” to separate entertainment from essential infrastructure, 
reducing network strain.128 Reducing the network strain would 
arguably reduce the need to rely on paid-prioritization and throttling.129 
However, under the Restoring Internet Freedom Order, ISPs would be 
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permitted to prioritize and throttle at will.130 The alternate 
infrastructure would not bypass traffic restrictions because ISPs are no 
longer motivated to throttle based on an overburdened network but 
instead for their own gain.131 So long as the incentive and ability to 
profit from prioritization, blocking, or throttling persists, broadband 
providers will restrict data access. 
Alternative markets only provide limited solutions and they can 
only benefit a limited number of artists who could persuade their 
audience to abandon the online market. Therefore, alternative markets 
may not be able to benefit smaller artists and genres. 
C. Music Subject to ISPs’ “Editorial Discretion” 
The FCC’s Restoring Internet Freedom Order does not expressly 
stipulate that ISP’s will be able to practice editorial discretion, but it is 
possible considering the Order’s rejection of past precedents. In 
Verizon, the broadband provider argued restrictions on different 
treatment of data violated the ISP’s editorial discretion.132 While 
Verizon was decided on administrative procedural grounds, the court 
in U.S. Telecomm. Ass’n v. F.C.C.. expressly denied that ISPs have 
editorial discretion because they neither select nor produce content, 
meaning any editorial discretion would interfere with the virtuous cycle 
of content creation, consuming, and sharing.133 But once broadband 
providers can discriminate via throttling, blocking, and preferencing, 
they would have the ability to effectively curate content. In the case of 
paid-prioritization, some subsidized data has direct and related 
financial support, such as AT&T’s sponsored data plan. However, 
questions arise where the subsidizing party remains confidential, as in 
T-Mobile’s Music Freedom service. By benefitting certain services and 
providers without a clear financial reason, T-Mobile exercises editorial 
discretion in what content and providers are subsidized.  
ISPs’ curating amounts to corporate expression, which the 
Supreme Court has recognized as protected under the First 
Amendment.134 Previously, ISPs had limited speech rights because 
they simultaneously enjoyed immunity for illegal content made 
available by users accessing the ISPs’ services.135 Speech rights are not 
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new to mass communications organizations. Newspapers and new 
media who exercise editorial discretion are subject to a public interest 
standard that varies depending on the outlet. Restrictions on 
newspapers’ editorial discretion that supposedly advance the public 
interest must survive strict scrutiny.136 Regulations that curb 
broadcasters’ editorial discretion need only survive an unclear but 
lesser form of heightened scrutiny because broadcast uses 
electromagnetic spectrum, a limited resource.137  
The issue for the courts would be drawing an analogous model of 
discretion between other forms of new media and the Internet. Thus 
far, the Supreme Court’s underwhelming understanding of the Internet 
likened it to a “vast library” and shopping mall for all of the available 
services.138 This view parallels other new media models where the 
technology acts to facilitate the user’s receipt of information. ISPs can 
defend the practice of curating and restricting content based on this 
model because the Internet is not considered a traditional public forum 
where speech restrictions are at their weakest. The Supreme Court 
refused to recognize the Internet as a traditional public forum because 
they refused to hold other forms of new media to the same standard.139 
However, this view arguably ignores the most compelling aspect of the 
Internet, the ease for a user to actually produce and spread 
information.140 A select few are able to distribute information via 
newspaper, radio, or cable. Internet access naturally carries the ability 
for any participant to contribute. Therefore, the Supreme Court’s model 
for speech on the Internet needs desperate revamping before ISP 
discretion is reviewed. As a result, recognizing and protecting ISPs’ 
corporate speech rights simultaneously stymies users’ speech rights to 
participate on the Internet as a general forum.141 
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Regardless of a future court’s interpretation, niche music genres 
are threatened unless the music industry reframes its interest to better 
accommodate artists or the FCC recognizes the fundamental value of 
content providers in the virtuous circle and prioritizes their speech 
rights over ISPs. The sobering reality of the FCC’s repeal of its net 
neutrality regime is the lack of novel revelations. Pai’s FCC abandons 
content providers, for example musical artists. Although courts have 
endorsed the “virtuous circle” theory of artists distributing their content 
online, accessing users who further broadcast the work,142 Pai has 
chosen to ignore edge provider and information access. The FCC’s 
abrogation of its core methodology is self-destructive, instead favoring 
ISP profits. 
III. MUSIC AND THE “PUBLIC INTEREST” 
The FCC’s general duty is to ensure wired and wireless 
communications further the public interest because the electromagnetic 
spectrum is a limited resource in the communications context.143 
Following the repeal of net neutrality protections, music must rely on 
alternative markets for artists to reach audiences.144 The primary 
alternative market for distribution of recordings will involve both unit-
sales and broadcasting. Typically, a consumer does not purchase an 
album without first sampling it by listening to some of the songs on the 
album. Based on this process, broadcast and radio has traditionally 
acted as the introduction to the music, gaining initial interest until the 
consumer decides to purchase the album for their own use. Therefore, 
alternative markets will inevitably rely on the broadcasting and music 
will be subject to the relevant public interest standard if artists hope to 
compete in the alternative market. 
Congress required that radio broadcasts furthered the public 
interest because they used electromagnetic spectrum.145 When it came 
to defining the public interest, the FCC had to identify the values 
attached to furthering the public interest as well as what parties would 
be responsible for determining whether content furthered the public 
interest. While the public interest remained vague, the FCC initially 
determined that broadcasters would have editorial discretion and had a 
duty to act as public trustees, playing content they deemed relevant to 
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the public’s interest.146 While this gave DJs amorphous guidance as to 
content, it failed to address how to further the public interest when 
multiple broadcasters, all public trustees, were forced to compete. 
Adopting an alternative model, the Federal Radio Commission 
was tasked in 1929 with licensing spectrum to three competing 
broadcasters in the Chicago area.147 To settle the debate, the FRC 
assigned certain times and channels to the broadcasters based on the 
demographic the content aimed to serve.148 This would become the 
groundwork for the “marketplace” theory of public interest that would 
come to replace the trustee model.149 The marketplace theory not only 
settled disputes amongst trustees, it became the standard for 
broadcasters to meet in order to maintain a broadcasting license.150 
Broadcasters could select content that would be relevant to the market 
and would be held accountable by complaints to the FCC from 
members of the market who felt their interests, as the market and 
public, were not being represented.151 
In addition, the market could impose content restrictions by filing 
complaints against broadcasters for carrying content that was patently 
offensive.152 The Supreme Court in Pacifica held that a radio station 
violated local norms by broadcasting George Carlin’s profanity laden 
“Seven Dirty Words” routine during the mid-afternoon because a radio 
audience is a captive audience; the audience therefore had limited 
choices in content and had no control over the broadcasters’ editorial 
discretion.153 As a result, broadcasters took on a duty to censor 
themselves as part of their role serving the public interest.154 
While music and radio seem to be a harmonious pair, it must be 
reiterated that the Internet was the original alternate market that 
replaced radio. Internet prevailed as the primary channel for music 
because it was not subject to the same public interest requirements as 
broadcast. Therefore, it should not be assumed that radio is an adequate 
alternative for music when net neutrality can no longer preserve an 
equal playing field for artists. Music largely abandoned radio years ago 
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because the Internet let artists pursue audiences more directly with 
greater freedom of expression. The music industry today, full of diverse 
content relying on the Internet, could not be replicated with radio as an 
alternate market. 
First, music diversity and minority genres relied on the Internet 
because there was not a substantial enough market share of interested 
audience members to appeal to broadcasters. Broadcasters seek popular 
genres with larger audiences to bring in more ad revenue. Profit 
interests motivate broadcasters, not artists or diverse representation. 
The second notable difference between radio and the Internet’s 
music catalogues is on-demand music access. Giving the audience the 
power to control what specific content they hear removes the captive 
audience qualification. The Supreme Court in Pacifica specifically 
drew the distinction between a captive audience and one who would 
have the power to choose to listen to certain content in the privacy of 
their home.155 The audience then takes on the role as curator but need 
only appease themselves rather than the public interest. 
Finally, because the audience is willing rather than captive, 
censoring for indecency is no longer relevant. Internet music services 
allowed the audience to access some music that may not be appropriate 
for radio. As a result, artists were no longer restricted to reaching an 
audience by the content of their music. In addition, content deigned 
indecent for radio may not be lacking social value depending on the 
local cultural standards and norms. In this country, music and 
expression occur in the context of a pluralistic society. The variety of 
cultures and viewpoints inevitably carries some strife. An agonistic 
democracy requires views to compete, challenge hegemonic norms, 
and protect minority views from censoring by a controlling 
establishment.156 Broadcasters, serving the public interest, are 
incentivized to focus on the majoritarian belief system and may self-
censor when faced with an opportunity to advance challenging 
minority views. Because cultural representation is an essential part of 
music diversity,157 broadcasters invariably stifle cultural viewpoints by 
serving the marketplace.  
Music diversity thrived under a free and open Internet because 
cultural sub-genres were allowed to grow. Internet substituted radio as 
the primary music channel because broadcasting lacked such openness. 
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Forcing artists to regress back to broadcasting will only create more 
restrictions on cultural representation in music. 
CONCLUSION 
Repealing net neutrality protections would vastly inhibit artists 
from reaching audiences. While musicians have had a complicated 
relationship with the Internet, balancing audience access and illegal file 
sharing for instance, music diversity has been undeniably benefitted. 
Communities share and critique works in genre specific forums. 
Subgenres persist because they have a sustainable population of 
interested audience members. Previously, artists had to rely solely on 
local communities rather than global networks. 
Forcing artists to rely on prioritized distribution outlets gives the 
ISP and a select few edge providers substantial bargaining power over 
artists, meaning the already minimal streaming royalties will continue 
to decline. In addition, forcing the music industry to regress into 
alternative markets will further demonstrate the necessity of a free and 
open Internet. Alternative markets, namely broadcasting, are extremely 
limited in their scope of interests under a marketplace model. The 
public interest doctrine as applied to radio is insufficient to allow niche 
genres to flourish in the face of net neutrality’s repeal. By restricting 
the FCC’s definition of the public interest to preventing 
anticompetitive practices, the agency ignores the true value of the 
Internet: abundant content creators, simplified distribution, and 
expansive audience access. Musicians are a small category of the 
content creators and edge providers that the FCC’s policy ignores.  
The impact of the 2017 Order on music serves as an allegory for 
the Order’s effects on democracy. The FCC dismissed noneconomic 
harms left unaddressed as “small.”158 As the 2017 Order faces vacatur 
in court,159 those democratic concerns should not go unheard. A court 
may vacate an agency action for being arbitrary and capricious.160 The 
2015 Order sought to protect democratic values and expression.161 The 
inversion of the FCC’s position on democratic reliance on a free and 
open Internet cannot be dismissed and treated as insubstantial 
compared to the protections to competitions the 2017 Order purports to 
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offer.162 Artists’ voices contribute to the greater chorus of expression 
reliant on net neutrality that informs and shapes democracy and culture. 
The FCC’s refusal to recognize the democratic value of the Internet, 
and the need for common carriage style rules to protect it, amount to 
arbitrary and capricious decision-making. The FCC failed to address 
the relevant and substantial impacts on democracy of repealing the 
2015 Order. Such an omission amounts to grounds for vacatur.163  
If left standing, Pai’s choice to repeal the Title II protections 
should be viewed as a lament. It is the final song of a tragedy where the 
FCC’s self-destruction has been driven by coercive forces seeking 
control over a digital world. The show may go on though. Vacation of 
the 2017 Order will return broadband regulation to a freer and more 
open Internet, a system that greatly benefits artists and the music 
industry. Rather than Wotan’s raven’s spreading the flames, 
democracy may re-emerge, more akin to a phoenix, so expression may 
be free from corporate gatekeeping control.  
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